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Plaintiff Argus brought action for injuries received from falling in some oil
on the driveway of a filling station operated by defendant Michler. Plaintiff, en-
route home, had stepped off a bus in front of defendant's filling station, with the
intent to call his wife and have her pick him up in their car. He originally intended
to call from a public phone booth across the street, but seeing that it was
occupied proceeded toward defendant's station to use the phone there. On the
way he fell. He then went into the station, called his wife, and told her to pick
him up at an ice cream shop located across the street. Plaintiff testified that he
intended to do some tire shopping at the station in addition to making the phone
call. Defendant testified that the phone was a pay phone which he kept there
for the use of his customers on the chance that they might come in and end up
buying some tires. However, he received no revenue from the phone. The trial
court instructed the jury that if they found that plaintiff went on the premises for
the purpose of using the telephone for a personal call and not for the mutual bene-
fit of both himself and defendant, then the jury should find for defendant. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. On appeal, keld, affirmed. If
plaintiff went on the premises of defendant for the purpose of making a phone
call, he was a licensee at best. The chance that plaintiff might buy some tires was
insufficient to constitute real benefit to the defendant, and thus the plaintiff was
not an invitee.
The determination of the status of plaintiff as an invitee or licensee was vital
because of the difference in duty owed to each by a possessor of land. The Re-
statement of Torts2 defines the duty of a possessor of land as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to busi-
ness visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care cotild discover, the con-
dition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unrea-
sonable risk to them, and (b) has no reason to believe that they will dis-
cover the condition or realize the risk involved therein, and (c) invites or
permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasona-
ble care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to give a
warning....
1. 349 S.W.2d 389 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934).
(320)
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This section is cited by many Missouri cases, 3 and would seem to be the accepted
law of the state.
On the other hand, the duty owed a licensee is dependent upon the type of
harm threatened. A possessor of land owes a duty of ordinary care as to affirmative
conduct on the land and, of course, owes a duty to refrain from wanton or in-
tentional injury.4 However, even though a possessor of land owes a licensee a duty
of ordinary care as to affirmative conduct, the possessor of land may assume that
the licensee is alert.5 It is generally held, moreover, that a possessor of land owes
no duty to a licensee as to dangerous conditions of the land, for the licensee "takes
the premises as he finds them." 6 So, in the instant case, if the plaintiff was merely
a licensee, the defendant-filling station operator owed him no duty as to the oil
spot, while if he was an invitee he was owed at least a duty of a warning.
The first courts in the United States which made a distinction between
licensees and invitees based the distinction not upon the idea of mutual benefit,
but upon express or implied invitation r As the court in Davis v. Congregational
Society asserted:
It makes no difference that no pecuniary profit or other benefit was re-
ceived or expected. . . .The fact that plaintiff comes by invitation is
enough to impose the duty which lies at the foundation of this liability. 8
In 1880, Mr. Justice Harlan, in Bennet v. Railroad Co.,9 mentioned the idea
of mutual advantage or common interest as a distinguishing factor between in-
vitees and licensees. The first state case to repudiate the "express or implied
invitation" distinction was Plummer v. Dill.1" Judge Knowlton, speaking for
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, concluded that the determining factor
in classifying between a licensee and an invitee was the existence of some economic
benefit to the possessor of land. Today, most courts,1 including the jurisdiction
3. Gruetzemacher v. Billings, 348 S.W.2d 952, 957-58 (Mo. 1961); Haire v.
Stagner, 356 S.W.2d 305, 308-09 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962).
4. Menteer v. Scalzo Fruit Co., 240 Mo. 177, 144 S.W. 833 (1912); Ander-
son v. Welty, 334 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960).
5. Reedy v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 347 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1961);
Sites v. Knott, 197 Mo. 684, 96 S.W. 833 (1906). But see Anderson v. Welty, supra
note 4, at 138, where the court stated: "Our appellate courts repeatedly have said
that one is not required to look for danger when he has no cause to anticipate it,
or when danger would not exist but for the negligence of another ... "
6. Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955) (en banc).
But see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 342 (1934).
7. Davis v. Congregational Society, 129 Mass. 367 (1880); Sweeny v. Old
Colony Newport R.R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 368 (1865).
8. Supra note 7, at 372.
9. 102 U.S. 577, 585 (1880).
10. 156 Mass. 426 (1892).
11. E.g., Porter v. Thompson, 74 Cal. App. 2d 474, 169 P.2d 40 (1946);
North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Adams, 143 So. 2d 355 (Fla. App. 1962); Ethe-
ridge Motors Inc. v. Haynie, 103 Ga. App. 676, 120 S.E.2d 317 (1961);
Ellguth v. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 Ill. 343, 97 N.E.2d 290 (1951); Lindelow
v. Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962).
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where the "implied or express invitation" distinction originated,12 follow this
distinction as to economic benefit. Thus the Restatement of Torts,13 in full con-
currence with most courts, using the word "business visitor" as synonymous with
"invitee," states:
A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or re-
main on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirect-
ly connected with business dealings between them.
The leading case in Missouri expounding the requirement of economic benefit
is Glaser v. Rothlsclild.24 The court in that case used the term "mutual benefit."
However, it would seem from the fact situations in that case, and following cases,
that some "economic benefit" is what is actually required. Since the Glaser case,
the idea of economic benefit, rather than invitation, has grown into an integral
part of the Missouri law relating to invitees, and is, consequently, the deciding
factor for purposes of classification. In fact, invitation may be inferred from the
existence of economic benefit.15
The majority of jurisdictions today look to the purpose of the visit to de-
termine whether a person holds the status of an invitee or merely a licensee.16 If
the purpose of the visit was of some real benefit to the possessor of land, the per-
son visiting will be accorded the status of an invitee and, therefore, may expect
a duty of ordinary care as to dangerous conditions of the land. It would seem that
the term "real benefit" is synonymous with "economic benefit."
In determining whether a person is to be accorded the status of an invitee or a
licensee, courts have generally gone out of their way to find some economic bene-
fit to the possessor of land.'1 The case at hand is somewhat unusual in this respect;
12. Zaia v. "Italia" Societa Anonyma Di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87
N.E.2d 183 (1949). The court, while seemingly basing its opinion on "express or
implied invitation," stated: "There must be a real or apparent intent on the part
of the invitor to benefit in a business or commercial sense. .. " 324 Mass. at 549,
87 N.E.2d at 184.
13. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 332 (1934). But see RESTATEMENT (SEcow),
ToRs § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 5, April 8, 1960).
14. 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909).
15. Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W.2d 820 (1945); Moss v. Nooter
Corp., 334 S.W.2d 647, 652 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
16. E.g., Stevenson v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S.W.2d
260 (1942).
17. Porchey v. Kelling, supra note 15.
18. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Lowery, 263 Ala. 36, 81 So. 2d
284 (1955) (on premises of bank for purpose of changing $100 bill); Fisher v.
Hardesty, 252 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1952) (in drug store with purpose of registering
for free prizes); Spurlock v. Union Fin. Co., 363 Mo. 62, 248 S.W.2d 578 (1952)
(on used car lot for purpose of looking at automobiles and purchasing one if to
liking); Gilliland v. Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933) (school chil-
dren on premises, at invitation of owner, for purpose of inspecting methods of
operating bakery-creamery); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d
609 (1950). But see Edwards v. Lederer, 339 Ill. App. 647, 90 N.E.2d 799 (1950)
(person going to back of store to get free box, held licensee); Dofner v. Branard,
236 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (person who went into filling station for
purpose of obtaining information held not an invitee).
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the court held that if the plaintiff walked onto defendant's premises with the pur-
pose of using the phone, the chance that he might buy some tires was too incidental
to be considered a real benefit. However, many courts have found economic bene-
fit in such incidental things as going into a filling station with the sole purpose
of using the rest room,19 in a customer's use of a rest room in stores, 0 and enter-
ing a store with the single purpose of using the phone.2' It would seem to require
more searching to find an economic benefit in those cases than in the case at hand.
The decision in the instant case may represent an attempt to check the
tendency of courts to find economic benefit in an increasing number of situations.
It should be remembered, however, that the instant case emanated from the St.
Louis Court of Appeals. To date, the Missouri Supreme Court has shown no de-
sire to restrict the factual situations regarding invitees.
LESLIE M. CROUCH
19. Dym v. Merit Oil Corp., 130 Conn. 585, 36 A.2d 276 (1944); Shaw v.
Piper's Super Service Station, 312 Ill. App. 656, 38 N.E.2d 785 (1942).
20. Main v. Lehman, 294 Mo. 579, 243 S.W. 91 (1922); Scott v. Kline's, 284
S.W. 831 (St. L. Ct. App. 1926).
21. Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Adt. 502 (1931); Dowling v. Machean
Drug Co., 248 Ill. App. 270 (1928).
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